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	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
3	No. 1:09-cr-10166-MLW-ALL
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5	THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
6	THE ONE THE STREET OF TIMELY CIT
7	vs.
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9	SALVATORE F. DIMASI, ET AL
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13	For Hearing Before:
1.4	Chief Judge Mark L. Wolf
L5	
16	Pretrial Conference
L7	
.8	United States District Court District of Massachusetts (Boston.)
.9	One Courthouse Way
1	Boston, Massachusetts 02210 Wednesday, June 17, 2009
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3	REPORTER: RICHARD H. ROMANOW, RPR Official Court Reporter
4	United States District Court One Courthouse Way, Room 5200, Boston, MA 02210
5	bulldog@richromanow.com



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For Richard D. Vitale

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## PROCEEDINGS

(Begins, 11:00 a.m.)

THE CLERK: United States versus Salvatore

DiMasi, et al., Criminal Number 09-10166. The Court is
in session. Please be seated.

THE COURT: Good morning. Would counsel please identify themselves for the Court and for the record.

MR. MERRITT: Good morning, your Honor. Theodore Merritt on behalf of the government.

MR. FULLER: Anthony Fuller on behalf of the government, as well, your Honor.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Good morning, your Honor. Robert Goldstein on behalf of Joseph Lally, who is present in court.

MR. WEINBERG: Good morning, your Honor.

Martin Weinberg for Richard Vitale, who is sitting to my right.

MR. KILEY: Good morning, your Honor. Thomas R. Kiley. Mr. DiMasi, to my left. And Mr. Cintolo is with us both.

MR. DRECHSLER: Good morning, your Honor. Tom Drechsler for Mr. McDonough, who is here in court.

THE COURT: Okay,

As you know, this case was randomly assigned to

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me. Magistrate Judge Collings is, at least for the time being, handling the early phases, including discovery. However, there are several issues that I wanted to discuss at the outset with counsel and the parties.

I think before discussing what the case is about, it's prudent and appropriate to tell you certain things and give you a chance to ask me any questions, express any concerns you might immediately have. I'll give the parties an opportunity to respond after today. However, I think, these are matters that counsel should discuss with their clients.

I feel comfortable that I'm not biased or prejudiced in any way and my recusal, based on the individual matters I'll describe to you, that those matters, cumulatively, in my present view, certainly wouldn't require my recusal under Section 455(b)(1) of Title 28, nor, at the moment, do I believe that a reasonable person would question my impartiality based on the matters I'll describe to you. So -- if I had come to that conclusion, I would disqualify myself under Section 455(a). But I do want to consider any questions or concerns that you may have today, but particularly after today.

There are three things that I want to describe and then ask you, within reason, whether you'd like to ask

me anything else.

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First, I believe I've met Mr. DiMasi once. We sat together at a Boston Bar Association luncheon in connection with its annual meeting several years ago. It's possible we've encountered each other at some other time, but that's the one time I remember meeting Mr. DiMasi. We were seated at a table of about 10 people. We were not seated next to each other, as I recall.

But would anybody like to ask me any questions about that?

MR. KILEY: Did he behave himself, your Honor?

THE COURT: I don't remember anything memorable.

Okay. Second, the Deputy Clerk assigned to me is Dennis O'Leary. Mr. O'Leary is married to another employee of the court, Eugenia O'Leary. Mr. O'Leary advised me that his wife, Eugenia's aunt, told Eugenia that she worked for one of the defendants. And we're going to have a closed session where I'm going to give you, in the greater detail, the names -- or the name. But as this is a matter that occurred before the grand jury, at least until I consult the government, I don't want to discuss it on the public record. Well, let me

take a step back.

Dennis O'Leary told me that his wife's aunt told his wife that she worked for one of the defendants identified and that she had been called to testify before the grand jury. Because grand jury matters are secret, unless it's necessary to make them public in connection with a court proceeding, generally, as I said, and I'm not saying the name right now, but we'll go back in the lobby and I'll tell you later and they'll be a transcript and perhaps it will be made part of the public record.

In any event, Mr. O'Leary told me that he and his wife, Eugenia, have not discussed his wife's aunt's grand jury testimony or the case with the aunt. They were just told that she testified. And Mr. O'Leary thinks that the prosecutors may have been told about this connection.

Mr. O'Leary is not here today. If necessary or appropriate, I could exclude him from all participation in the case. It would be somewhat disruptive, but not impossible to deal with. However, I thought I should promptly bring that to your attention.

Are there questions you'd like to ask me about that? Is this something that -- does the government know what I'm talking about?

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MR. FULLER: I believe so, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, I will, as I said, give you the name of the aunt and the defendant for whom she worked, when we go back, and perhaps it will soon be made part of the public record. But I want to hear from counsel on that.

And then the third and last thing that I thought I should tell you is the following. Since 1986, I've been the chair of a program called the John William Ward Public Service Fellowship for Boston Latin School students. It is a program that gets summer jobs with public officials in the Commonwealth to encourage them to become engaged citizens and public leaders. They work for the Governor, the Mayor, some of them work in the State Legislature, although none work for Speaker DiMasi. As I recall, the Ward Fellows worked in the Attorney General Bellotti's office in the early years of the program when Mr. Kiley was the First Assistant.

As a judge I cannot be involved in any fundraising and I'm not involved in any fundraising for this program. It doesn't need or have much money. But the limited fundraising that is done is done by now the former fellows and other leaders of the program. Every year, and sometimes periodically, I see financial statements and they show who made contributions to the

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program. And one of the former fellows, who is now a young lawyer and a leader of the program, whose name I can tell you, if you think it's important, but if the name is not important, I won't mention it, has a mother who is employed by the Vitale Catarino accounting firm. The accounting firm has a foundation. And I don't think this is anything that the government knows anything about. I'm looking at Mr. Fuller looking at Mr. Merritt.

In 2006 and 2007, this young man's mother applied to the foundation, which apparently considers applications or requests from employees of the firm, for a contribution to the Boston Latin School Association for the Ward Fellows Program. \$500 contributions were made by the foundation in 2006 and 2007.

I would have seen that. I don't have any memory of having seen it, but the name of the firm wouldn't have meant anything or the name of the foundation wouldn't have meant anything to me at that time.

On about December 21st of last year, 2008, there was a reunion of the Ward Fellows and this young lawyer asked me if his mother should not ask the foundation for a contribution again, for 2008, because Mr. Vitale's name had been in the newspaper as being under investigation, a Federal investigation, I think, and I

didn't tell him that she couldn't ask again, for several reasons.

One is that I know the young man's mother and I know that she takes pride in being able to generate support for a program that meant a lot to her son. I was told that the foundation was separate from the firm and I understood from the young lawyer and/or from the media -- and I checked again, that it was in the May 17th, 2008 Boston Globe, and that Mr. Vitale was retired from his firm. The money wasn't being given to me, certainly. Mr. Vitale was only reportedly under investigation. There was no Federal charge or case. And I didn't know the case would get assigned to me, if there was a case.

So as far as I knew, Mr. Vitale didn't have any role in the foundation, at the end of that party, in a conversation that probably took a minute or two, at the most, and I said that it would be okay if his mother wanted -- well, I wasn't telling him not to do it. I'm not generally involved in these things and I didn't seek to veto it.

I've checked the records. On December 23rd, 2008, a \$500 contribution was made by the Vitale Catarino Foundation through the Boston Latin School Association for the Ward Fellows Program. As I said, I can give you

the name of the young lawyer and his mother, if you'd like.

But would anybody like to ask me any questions about that?

MR. FULLER: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Is there anything else, within reason, you'd like to ask me about that might relate to the propriety of my participation?

(Silence.)

THE COURT: All right. And does anybody have any immediate concerns? You shouldn't be timid about expressing them.

(Silence.)

this. But I am directing that defendants' counsel speak to the defendants, discuss all of this, see whether they have any concerns or objections. But essentially the relevant questions are whether you think a reasonable person could question my impartiality if that person knew what I've described? And if a reasonable person, in the circumstances, would question my impartiality, if I shouldn't participate in the case? And that's a ground for recusal that could be waived under Section 455(e) so the order will ask whether, in any event, you waive any argument or objection under Section 455(a).

And the government will have to consider this and tell me its position, too.

I can't completely delegate the decision regarding

recusal to the parties. I have a duty to protect against forum shopping, as the First Circuit discussed in In re Allied Signal, 891 F. 2nd 967 at 970, and as I later discussed in Salemme, 164 F. Supp. 2nd 86.

However, I will consider the parties' views very seriously, as I did in the Sawyer case in about 1994. There's a September 2, 1994 order in Sawyer. And I certainly am not going to take offense or be affected as we go ahead, if anybody raises a question, expresses a concern, or makes an objection that doesn't ultimately prove to be persuasive. However, as I said, I think it's very important to deal with these matters at the beginning of any case and hopefully put them to rest.

Would it be reasonable for me essentially to ask you to make filings on this issue, say, by Friday?

MR. KILEY: Yes.

MR. FULLER: That's fine, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And does anybody have any concern or objection to my proceeding today?

MR. WEINBERG: No, your Honor.

MR. KILEY: No.

MR. DRECHSLER: Can I ask one procedural

question, Judge? If we have no position, there's no objection or anything, must we file something?

THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. DRECHSLER: Okay.

THE COURT: You're going to tell me -- it's going to be in writing. You're going to tell me that either you have an objection and explain it or you're going to tell me that there is no objection and you're going to tell me whether you also -- your clients waive any Section 455(a) ground for recusal as is permitted under Section 455(e). Okay?

MR. DRECHSLER: Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.

I've read the indictment in the case and certain other filings, but it's always my practice, when I see counsel and the parties in a criminal case for the first time, to ask for an overview and essentially what you think I ought to know to have a fuller flavor of it as we begin to proceed. So I'll hear from the government and then if there's anything the defendants would like to tell me, I'm interested in that, too.

MR. MERRITT: Well, your Honor, I think -- as the Court has read the indictment, it pretty much lays out a fairly good and factual detail of what the allegations are. Obviously I'm sure there will be some

1 legal filings concerning the honest services theory, but 2 apart from that, the government thinks it's a fairly 3 straightforward case. 4 THE COURT: Famous last words, in my 5 experience. But actually that is helpful. The theory of the 6 7 case is a conspiracy to deprive the public of the honest 8 services of a public official? 9 MR. MERRITT: Correct, and the scheme itself. THE COURT: Well, a mail fraud, a wire fraud, 10 but the -- well, what are the leading cases on that 11 12 theory now? I haven't looked at it in about 25 years. 13 MR. MERRITT: Well, most recently in the First 14 Circuit there is the Potter case, United States vs. Potter, That was cited. And United States vs. 15 16 Urcluoli, if I'm pronouncing that correctly. And, of 17 course, the leading cases still go back to sawyer and 18 Woodward. 19 THE COURT: Okav. 20 (Pause.) 21 THE COURT: And this will evolve. But do you 22 have a sense of about how long you think it would take 23 the government to put its case in?

MR. MERRITT: I would suggest about three

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weeks, your Honor.

THE COURT: I know that Magistrate Judge Collings has talked to you about discovery. We'll get to that shortly. But -- well, all right.

Anything else you think I ought to know or have in mind?

MR. MERRITT: I don't think so, your Honor.

MR. WEINBERG: Your Honor, we think, in contrast to the government, that this is an unorthodox and even extraordinary expansion of a statute that is at the core of the Supreme Court's scrutiny. Within the past half a year, Justice Scalia, in dissenting from a denial of certiorari of a case named v.s. vs. sorich, S-O-R-I-C-H, expressed extreme concern about the lack of boundaries in 1346, which was Congress's 1988, I believe, response to the Supreme Court decision in MoNally that talked about the absence of any contours or structure in honest services jurisprudence. Justice Scalia identified a split in circuits and a search for boundaries and, in fact, cited to the Urcluoli case, which is U-R-C-I-U-O-L-I, a First Circuit decision by then Chief Judge Boudin.

THE COURT: Out of Rhode Island?

MR. WEINBERG: Out of Rhode Island, your

Honor. And it's a case I'm familiar with. I

represented Mr. Urciuoli and he's back on Urciuoli II,

which is again before the Court of Appeals. But then Chief Justice Boudin talked about a need for and a search for a principle narrowing an expansive statute.

Justice Scalia talked about 28 words that had generated, in the years since MoNally, a search for boundaries and the Ninth Circuit, in a case called Kincaid, K-I-N-C-A-I-D, articulated four different theories by which different circuits tried to cabin in the boundarilessness of the 28 words of 1346. In the Black case, of course, the Supreme Court, you know, focused on a split in circuits --

MR. WEINBERG: Black's case, which was the portion of 1346 that did not relate to honest services, vis -- vis public officials, but instead related to honest services regarding private parties, employer/employee. To compound, the traditional theories are not delineated in this indictment, which are quid pro quo bribery and concealed conflict of interest. Those are the two in addition to the Sawyer theory, which added a third theory of some pattern of gratuities that caused a deviation from honest services.

You know, we, at least, would contend that this case, and the charges in the indictment, do not provide

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clear notice, at least to Mr. Vitale, as well as his co-defendants, as to just what the theory of criminality is except that it clearly impacts -- and this is where

THE COURT: You're saying the indictment doesn't provide clear notice?

MR. WEINBERG: Exactly, your Honor. Except that we believe that central to the litigation in this case will be whether or not these defendants, all four of them, conformed their conduct to state law? Sawyer says you don't need to violate a state law to qualify for Federal prosecution, although two other circuits, the Fifth in Brumley and the Third Circuit say you do.

But our defenses in this case will go beyond that set of criteria. We will be contending to the Court that it is because the defendants conformed their conduct to carefully architected state legal requirements, that they are entitled to the legal protection of that conformity. And that if it's the honest services of the state citizens that's being allegedly betrayed by the defendants, that if the state citizens elect legislators that enact a law that they conform with, that they should be protected and indeed immunized from Federal prosecution.

And to make things even one step, you know, more

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interesting, Urculoli II will address that exact matter before the Court of Appeals sometime in the late fall. He was -- he requested and was denied a theory of defense instruction about conforming to state law. Judge Lisi denied the instruction. The jury convicted him. Judge Lisi denied him bail pending appeal. First Circuit just reversed that portion of her decision.

And the central issue of Urcuioli II, which again has not been briefed, but will be presented to the Court of Appeals in the upcoming months, will be whether or not a theory of defense is viable to a 1346 prosecution based on a Federal prosecution when the defense is "I conformed with state law, so how could I betray the citizens of the state?"

So that's a kind of overview of what we think is an expansion of 1346 beyond its traditional theories. Beyond Sawyer. And, you know, we believe that the Court will need to address this defense. That Mr. Vitale, for instance, did not register as a lobbyist because he fit within an exemption under the state lobbying laws which presumes you're not required to register if you don't work 50 hours in any reporting period. I know that Mr. Kiley will inform the Court that it is part of Mr. DiMasi's potential defense is his conformity to

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state law and that this will be a central and common theme that the defense will bring.

THE COURT: I mean, this is the kind of preview of coming attractions I was hoping to get. seems to me, conceptually, at a very abstract level, something might not violate state law, but could violate Federal law. Here it's the mail fraud and the wire fraud statutes.

But do the arguments you make go to whether -well, the state of mind requirements of the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes, for example, intent to defraud?

MR. WEINBERG: I think they go to two different elements, one is the state of mind and whether or not somebody that believed they were conforming to state law could have the necessary criminal intent to cause deviation of honest services? But I also think it goes to the very essence of criminal scheme. And whether or not 1346 can be expanded so far from its heartland, which is quid pro quo bribery, the Seigelman case, an exchange of money for a job, to encompass the kind of conduct that the government is attempting to prosecute in this case?

THE COURT: I think you said, at the outset, that you challenge whether the indictment gives fair

notice?

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MR. WEINBERG: Yes, your Honor. It does not charge quid pro quo bribery, it does not charge a **Sawyer**-type pattern of gratuities designed to cause deviation, and it does not charge a concealment of a conflict of interest. And therefore we, at least on behalf of Mr. Vitale, I am without notice, constitutionally-required notice, as to what the 1346 theory is. Remember, 1346 is an unusually vague criminal statute.

THE COURT: Well, let me just ask you one question. You said the indictment doesn't give you notice.

MR, WEINBERG: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you anticipate complaining that the statute doesn't give you notice?

MR, WEINBERG: Yes, your Honor. And the statute as applied in this case provides us with no notice.

THE COURT: Well, at some point I'll ask you whether there's any important First Circuit case after Anselem on whether a statute gives adequate notice?

Okay. Thank you. Mr. Kiley, is there anything I should know from your client's perspective?

MR. KILEY: What Mr. Weinberg represented, I

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think, speaks for all of us. We do think that this case will present a very involved set of circumstances for you to evaluate the way state law and Federal law come together in defining the honest services duty that an individual owes. And we will indeed be arguing to you ultimately that all of the Speaker's -- that all of the Speaker's actions were expressly authorized by law and permitted by law and that there's been no violation of the statute.

In terms of the overview that you want, the case law that you want, I think Mr. Weinberg, Mr. Merritt have given it all to you. The one nonprecedential matter that I would suggest to you, when you're looking at the First Circuit cases, the Urcuioli line of cases, the cases that come out of Rhode Island, are very enlightening because they -- because the actions of the Court, the District Judge, the Presiding Judge Lisi in Rhode Island, built on the most recent Federal precedents and in the trial of Messrs. Cramer and Ortiz, at the trial court level, following the return of all of the First Circuit precedents up to the Urcuioli II matter, the role that state law plays was a central part of the instructions and I think you're going to have to pay attention to that, your Honor.

> THE COURT: Do you anticipate -- and you're

not wedded to your answer on this. But do you anticipate raising these issues on a motion to dismiss the indictment or is it more likely that I'd be dealing with this during trial?

MR. KILEY: It's a certainty you'll be dealing with it at trial if you don't dispose of it with motions to dismiss. There may be dispositive motions.

THE COURT: All right. I think -- I'm sorry. Go ahead.

MR. KILEY: Again, your Honor, Mr. Weinberg laid it out, from the defense perspective, perfectly,

THE COURT: Well, assuming, as I do for present purposes, that I continue in the case, I will be interested, in some fashion, addressing these issues before we get to trial, even if it's only in the context of anticipating what proper jury instructions would be.

MR. KILEY: Well, the spirit is really just to inform you what you will be dealing with.

THE COURT: Right, And the fact that you told me today communicates that you're not waiting until a jury is impaneled and hoping anybody will be surprised by this. We'll deal with it.

All right. Mr. Goldstein? Mr. Drechsler?

MR. GOLDSTEIN: There's one issue that may apply only to Mr. Lally, I'm not sure, and it's that

Mr. Lally has expressed a strong interest to me, as his lawyer, to secure as speedy a trial as possible in this case. And I don't know what time frame encapsulates "as possible." We're in the very nascent stages in terms of discovery production.

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THE COURT: I'd say I'm with Mr. Lally and I'd like to see this case proceed with all deliberate speed. We're going to get to talking about discovery in a moment. There does have to be complete discovery and there does have to -- you know, the issues that are raised have to be dealt with. But it would be my goal, you know, to give this high priority to assure that you all have enough time to do what needs to be done thoughtfully and thoroughly and not have it progress in any artificially fast pace, but it would be regarded as a priority matter.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: And that's what Mr. Lally is interested in. What I would just add, Judge, is that one of the primary motivating factors behind that request is Mr. Lally has, in essence, become unemployable in his chosen field as a result of the intense coverage the investigation received by the Globe. It's practically impossible for Mr. Lally to secure employment. Every time he gets close to a prospect, the prospect vanishes when likely these

companies perform, you know, what is today routine, in terms of Google and other kinds of background searches. And I know the Court has conducted -- had conducted some inquiry regarding the possibility that material had been improperly leaked to various newspaper outlets with regard to the government's investigation, and that certainly didn't help. But even without that, you know, Mr. Lally's ability to continue on this path is somewhat jeopardized the longer that this case progresses. And so on his behalf -- and I know it's an impossible question to answer today, not knowing the scope of discovery, but I did want to put it on the record.

THE COURT: That's useful. You know, it elicits my -- my frame of mind. This should be regarded as a priority matter to proceed with -- what the Supreme Court said in Brown, is "all deliberate speed." Nothing artificially quickly. Everything needs to be done thoroughly and thoughtfully. But as quickly as reasonably possible.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Drechsler.

MR. DRECHSLER: I really have nothing to add, Judge, to what's already -- I echo the thoughts of my brother counsel in this regard, other than I -- you know, until I -- like the Court says, until I've seen

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the discovery, I have no position to take regarding the schedule beyond that.

THE COURT: Well, that actually moves into what I had coming up next on my agenda.

Again, at the outset, I want to remind all of you of certain obligations that you have. We have Local Rule 83.2(a) which describes the parameters of permissible statements by attorneys in criminal cases. I read the news accounts.

The defendants have expressed some concern for pretrial publicity in various ways, I actually -things have changed in the last 25 years. There didn't use to be press conferences at the time of an indictment, there was a little press release, but now there are press conferences. I've read the news reports, some of them the day after the indictment in this case. I didn't perceive anything reported that was inconsistent with Rule 83.2(a) from the government, but I do point you to the rule. You want to keep it in mind. And it imposes obligations on defense lawyers as well as on prosecutors.

It's also important, as you know, to be sure that the restrictions relating to grand jury secrecy imposed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) are observed.

The next local Rule, 83.2(b), gives the Court the

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authority to impose special restrictions in highly publicized cases. That, hopefully, will not prove to be necessary or appropriate in this case. But that authority is there. It's inevitable in a case like this that there's going to be publicity and in other highly publicized cases, in my experience and in the experience of my colleagues, it's been possible to pick a fair jury, but that's always a concern. You know, it's a concern that's already been expressed in various ways in the short time this case has been pending. It's something important for everybody to remain sensitive to.

But at this point, is there anything anybody would like to say about this issue?

(Silence.)

THE COURT: All right.

Then, as I do the first time in every criminal case -- the first time I see the parties in any criminal case, I want to point you to the requirements of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and particularly the local rules of the District Court regarding discovery. The local rules provide for automatic discovery of material exculpatory information. That's Rule 116.2. That material exculpatory information has to be obtained from all

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agencies involved in the investigation of the case. That's Rule 116.8. Notes must be preserved. That's local Rule 116.9. And there's a continuing duty to supplement the disclosure.

You know, if information is developed in the course of the case that didn't exist when the earlier disclosure was made, there's a duty to promptly supplement it. The local rules just codify obligations imposed by the Constitution. But despite all kinds of efforts, there have been problems. Nobody wants any problems in this case.

So hopefully -- and I asked Magistrate Judge Collings to say this to you when he saw you as well. I can see this is not going to be entirely straightforward, that there's some legal issues, but every effort needs to be made to assure there's no reasonable basis for a complaint that the defendants or the government didn't get what they or it was entitled to, because there are reciprocal obligations imposed on the defendants under Rule 116.1(d) and under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. So the rules should be helpful to you. Use them as a road map.

Now, I see, in the file, that the government filed motions for lis pendens and also for preliminary restraint on certain assets. They were filed June 2nd

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and 3rd. To my knowledge, no oppositions have yet been filed. They'd be due around now.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Any opposition to the lis pendens were due yesterday. There'll be no opposition from Mr. Lally with regard to that. As relates to the government's proposed order restraining Mr. Lally's ability in terms of his property, which is 4 Oliver Swain Road, you know, we have conducted research regarding the propriety of the Government's order. I think today we'll mail you the filings. And we're reserving our right to later contest the order, if necessary. But there will be no opposition as of today.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR, KILEY: There is no intention to oppose the lis pendens on the part of Mr. DiMasi.

THE COURT: And what about the preliminary --

MR. KILEY: There is not.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Weinberg, are you subject to those motions?

MR. WEINBERG: I am not, Judge.

MR. DRECHSLER: We are not, Judge.

THE COURT; All right. So if I understand this correctly -- and a lis pendens ordinarily just is automatic. It just shows there's a dispute about the title. The restraining order, as I understand it, I can

enter it without prejudice to the parties moving for reconsideration. Is that right?

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Yes, Judge. There were issues legally regarding the scope of the restraining order requested by the government. I've spoken to Mr. Lally. He can live by the terms presently as they exist and if it comes an issue at a later point in time, I'll notify the Court.

THE COURT: All right. So the government would like me to enter the post-indictment restraining order in the form attached, is that correct?

MR. MERRITT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I plan to do that.

(Pause.)

else, that completes what I hoped to discuss in this public session. I am planning to see all of you back in the lobby in a session that will, at least temporarily, be closed to the public. I'll give you the name of Mrs. O'Leary's aunt. I'll also discuss with you a matter that is, at present, under seal. It relates in part to an issue that may implicate the attorney-client privilege. Such issues may justify the sealing of documents and the closure of proceedings, as the First Circuit said in Sidel v. Putnam, 147 F. 3rd 7 at 9. It

also relates, to some degree, with a grand jury matter that possibly should not be made public.

As the parties know, I have some questions with regard to whether sealing and closing the proceedings to the public are justified. But it's not only prudent, I find it's necessary to discuss those questions in a closed proceeding. A transcript will be made of that proceeding. That transcript can be unsealed fully or in redacted form if some redactions are appropriate.

Therefore, and unless some member of the public wants to be heard on that, we will recess and reconvene in the lobby.

Okay. The Court is in recess.

(Recess, 11:45 a.m.)

(In the lobby, 11:50 a.m.)

THE COURT: All right. Okay. We've reassembled in the lobby. We have everybody except Mr. Cintolo. I don't have either my Docket Clerk or my Deputy Clerk.

(Mr. Cintolo enters.)

THE COURT: And I've just been handed a June 16th, 2009 filing that the government made under seal. I haven't seen it before a few minutes ago. I assume it was filed yesterday?

MR. MERRITT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, it didn't come to my attention. Once I clarify who is going to be serving as my Deputy Clerk on this, I think, particularly if it's an urgent matter, if it's going to come in the day before the hearing, you should call or at least e-mail to let me know it's on the way.

I've just read it quickly. This goes to whether this hearing ought to be sealed --

MR. MERRITT: Yes, your Honor,

THE COURT: -- and closed to the public and the papers still sealed, which is what the government originally asked for? And I don't suggest, actually, improperly. I think when these kind of issues are raised, it's prudent to probably err on the side of

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requesting confidentiality and we can discuss the question, which in the process we're engaged in here.

I think I'll come back, at the end, to whether the -- I don't know if I can decide whether the proceedings should be open or the transcript should be promptly made available until I know what we're going to be talking about. So let's set some ground rules for proceeding.

And I think the government may want to read -reread the redacted version that was given to me. You
can't rely exclusively on word processing. You took the
attorney's last name out everywhere, but you left his
first name in the first time it came up. So go through
it again with human eyes. Sometimes the electronics can
be challenging.

You know, on the other hand, here, you know, we're not talking about wiretap information or information that's not likely to become public at some point, as far as I can tell. So you know I have concerns about closing this.

But, here, I told you I would tell you the name of Mrs. O'Leary's aunt. That's redacted . I'm told redacted .

So when you -- well, I'll put in my order that you ought to let me know, you know, whether you think I should essentially take Mr. O'Leary off the case.

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I feel, myself, comfortable that when I tell him "Don't discuss this with your wife and neither of you can discuss it with her aunt, " that he would follow that instruction. But, you know, if you think it's necessary or prudent that I just replace him, for the purposes of this case, then I expect I will do that.

But now that you know who this is, that it's , is there anything else you would like to ask or tell me?

MR. MERRITT: Well, I don't know if the Court knows the answer to this question, but how close a relationship is it between Mr. O'Leary's wife and her aunt?

THE COURT: I don't know the answer. In fact, neither of them are here, neither Mr. O'Leary nor Mrs. O'Leary are here this week, but I can talk to them on the telephone. She doesn't work in my session.

You know, there will be matters coming in under seal. On the other hand -- well, I'll ask. But maybe you ought to proceed on the assumption, you know, that it's reasonably close. And I haven't talked directly to Mrs. O'Leary about this, so I have hearsay about the original conversation. But I just think it's important that as many as these issues as possible, if they exist, you know, be surfaced, so that they can be considered at

the outset and that they be dealt with and that we can proceed.

All right. But this doesn't have to be a final answer, as I said, I can give you a couple of days to respond on these.

But do you have a concern about Mr. O'Leary continuing at this point?

MR. MERRITT: Not at this point, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. All right. Well, you go back and think about it, talk to your colleagues, talk to your clients, and you'll let me know.

All right. And then essentially just to preserve their privacy, if it's possible, I didn't tell you the name of the young lawyer or her mother, because they have nothing to do with the case, the young man who is the alumnus of the Ward Fellows program.

Does anybody feel you should have that name?

MR. MERRITT: No, your Honor.

MR. KILEY: I don't even want the name.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay. All right. What do you feel is going to need to be done to develop and fully brief this -- well, actually, let me take a step back.

(Pause.)

THE COURT: All right. What I'm interested

in, with regard to this motion to disqualify, is developing a briefing schedule and getting a sense of what's going to be necessary to resolve this.

And this is up to Mr. DiMasi, but as his lawyers may have told him, at some point I'm going to ask you, pursuant to the Supreme Court decision in Wheat, you know, a set of questions, you know, about if you want Mr. Kiley and Mr. Cintolo to continue to represent you and if you recognize that there are these issues and these risks, which I'll spell out. It may be desirable — but this is up to you, to get some independent legal advice. In other words, not from Mr. Kiley, not from Mr. Cintolo or from anybody sitting around the table, as to whether you should proceed with them as your lawyers or not.

As I said, that's up to you. I'm not ordering it. But I have two concerns that I have in every case. One, I want the proceedings to be fair to everybody and to have everybody energetically and effectively represented, and then, if it turns out there's a conviction, I want it to be final. I don't want to be in the situation where a convicted defendant can come back and have a colorable claim that, you know, "My lawyer was restricted improperly in his ability to represent me because of something."

So it will probably be August before we have this hearing, but you've got a right to consult somebody else on these issues, and while they are sealed materials now, I'll put it in my order that you would be permitted to, you know, consult another lawyer and that wouldn't be a violation of my order, unless somebody has a different thought on that.

MR. FULLER: No.

THE COURT: The government has no objection to that?

MR. FULLER: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So that's up to you.

All right. You know, what's going to be necessary to develop the factual record and complete the briefing on the issue -- the issues raised by the motion for disqualification? I saw there was a footnote, maybe in the file that Mr. Weinberg and Mr. Goldstein made, telling me something I anticipated, that you made the request for the full grand jury transcript?

MR. KILEY: I did, your Honor. The motion to disqualify was previewed and delivered to us at the time of arraignment, on the 8th, and literally immediately, I think by letter of the 9th, I requested the full transcript and other 3500 material and the government has responded and has provided me -- and I think it's a

1	footnote in their next-to-last submission, which
2	indicated that they provided an additional document,
3	it's an interview report. It is a significant interview
4	report, in my mind, because it indicates that what
5	P.A. told the interviewer, at the time, was that
6	I was not his lawyer. I was not then at least then
7	representing him. You don't have that before you, I
8	think, in any additional form. And otherwise declining
9	to provide the balance of the transcript.
10	Obviously I would like the balance of the
11	transcript. But they've made the decision not to do
12	that.
13	THE COURT: Do you intend to ask me to order
L4	them to give it to you?
15	MR. KILEY: Well, again, I haven't thought
16	that through.
l7	THE COURT: All right.
18	MR, KILEY: There is something I very much
19	intended to do and have refrained from doing because of
0 0	the impoundment and sealing order, and that's
1	communicating any further with that I have not
2	communicated since this issue was raised, with
3	P.A. , P.A.'s current counsel, and
4	P.A.'s former counsel, redacted ,
5	THE COURT: Who's his current counsel?

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MR. KILEY: . And my intention redacted would be to give you a factual record, which I expect would tell you --

THE COURT: Right. Well, as soon as I read the motion, I said to my law clerk that they're going to ask for the full grand jury transcript and all the 3500 materials that they ordinarily wouldn't be entitled to get this early. I didn't say I was going to give it, but I just said that this is going to be an issue. And I'd have to get a request and I'll have to deal with it, but what do those materials relate to, both whether there was an attorney-client relationship at all and whether there are any statements that might be made at trial that you would be a potential witness on?

MR. KILEY: I suppose both. Certainly when I ask for the grand jury transcript, I envision that it is going to contain more material than about his communications with me. But what I do think the record is going to show is that I never represented P.A. in connection with this Federal investigation and that all of my communications with him, with respect to this inquiry, were in the presence of his then counsel. I think that is going to be the case.

THE COURT: The grand jury testimony, the little excerpt I had, seemed to indicate that, at least

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the first time he met with you, he didn't have another lawyer?

MR. KILEY: Correct, and that's what I sought to distinguish, your Honor. The Federal investigation comes toward the tag end of it, after more than a year of other activity, and I think what the grand jury snippet suggests is that he, um, was seeking counsel through Mr. DiMasi first, who directed him to Mr. Egbert, with respect to what his duties were with respect to the Secretary of State's Office, and that, I think, is the matter that is laid out in the snippets as with regard to counsel. And I expect that's what the record would be and my position would be, that I never represented him in this matter and indeed I never opened the file, I never did an engagement letter, you know, I never took a penny from P.A. , and all of that will be in it.

That -- and this is just off the THE COURT: top of my head, and you'll address it, but, you know, the government cites cases that are consistent with my understanding, you know, that if somebody consults you even if it doesn't mature into a retained agreement, you know, that that might be a privileged communication. What I couldn't tell from the excerpt attached is when

P.A. learned that you were representing

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Mr. DiMasi. Did he know it from Day 1, as far as you're concerned, or did he learn it later?

MR. KILEY: Um, again, more than Day 1. I represented Mr. DiMasi, who was his law colleague, for -- on and off for more than a decade. So from Day 1 certainly.

THE COURT: Because, analytically, with regard to the government's argument that, you know, Mr. Kiley might be in a position to use confidential information of P.A. on behalf of Mr. DiMasi saying, say, cross-examining P.A. , you know, one of the questions I would have is that if he had no reasonable expectation of confidentiality from Mr. DiMasi, he might have it, you know, with regard to the world generally and what's the impact of that on the analysis? You don't need to answer it. Well, okay. Go ahead. Go ahead.

MR. FULLER: Well, I don't know, from the record that we provided, that Mr. DiMasi was present during that first meeting when P.A. met with Mr. Kiley.

THE COURT: And I assume he wasn't, but -
MR. FULLER: And so I don't understand that he

could expect Mr. DiMasi to have any knowledge of what he

told Mr. Kiley. So that --

THE COURT: Oh, I think this is their joint defense-type point.

MR. FULLER: Well, right, your Honor.

THE COURT: And this is just questions.

You've had a lot more time to think about it. If -
let's say Mr. Kiley was representing both of them, but

P.A. knew that Mr. Kiley was also representing

his traditional client. Then, um, the question I would

have is, is information P.A. gave Mr. Kiley

confidential information that Mr. Kiley can't use to

cross-examine P.A. ? Did he sort of assume that

risk that the defendant here, if they ever split, would

use that information against him through his lawyer?

MR. FULLER: I think certainly it would have to depend on the terms of any common defense. I don't know that there was one here, certainly in writing. But at the end of the day, your Honor, the confidentiality issue is really not what's driving our motion.

THE COURT: What is?

MR. FULLER: Well, it's certainly the appearance of the conflict that a key government witness sought counsel from the defendant's attorney and was told to tell the truth, which by virtue of that advice, seems to run counter to the interests of that defendant. Because as laid out in the indictment and in

our motion, that testimony, if truthful, is inculpatory of the defendant. So that's one thing. Because the advice given was essentially, um, about a key issue in this prosecution, namely this entire relationship between P.A. and Cognos and the payments and Mr. Kiley was privy or heard this witness describe it to him, we believe, in a consistent fashion as to what he will say at trial, again it's in our motion, that Mr. Kiley is a witness to his prior consistent statement. And that really, I think, separates -- to use a term Mr. Weinberg uses, it separates this from the heartland of these other cases. I don't know, of the cases we cite, there's really not a situation where the attorney-client relationship came about in the context of advice on the central issue that was to be tried in the criminal case. It's usually in the context of representing a co-defendant who may have information that may or may not inculpate another defendant and the courts are looking at it respectively not knowing what that witness may say, but there could be a conflict. Here we have a definitive conflict before us that actually makes the attorney a witness. THE COURT: Well, how is he a witness? MR. FULLER: Well, he's a possible witness.

THE COURT: Well, that may be. I mean, I'm

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telling you this just so you can better prepare to address it. There are a couple of things that come to my mind, as you say. To the extent that Mr. Kiley, arguably, shouldn't have been representing both of them, um, under the ethics rules, I don't know how that -- you know, whether that should be a basis for prompt disqualification or just something that should be dealt with if the Board of Bar Overseers is sufficiently interested in it. In other words, you say there's an appearance of --

MR. FULLER: Well, I'm not suggesting that he represented him in the sense of -- as Mr. Kiley said, he didn't represent him for the purposes of the Federal investigation, however, he did give advice about the grand jury --

THE COURT: Yeah, and I don't think that distinction is dispositive. You know, this was public and, I mean, and we had this at the outset of the Flemmi case where I think Mr. Egbert represented Mr. Flemmi and also previously represented one of the bookmakers, as I vaguely recall, Crantz, and the argument was that Mr. Egbert would be able to cross-examine Crantz, on behalf of Flemmi, relying on confidential information he received from Crantz. And that -- do I remember this right?

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MR. WEINBERG: I think that there was also the parallel component -- there were two parallel components to this case, one being the depth of Mr. Egbert's relationship with -- and the corollary, the depth of Flemmi's need to continue that relationship, which I think parallels the depth of the DiMasi/Kiley relationship, the complexity of this case, and really the irreplaceability of Tom Kiley to Sal DiMasi, as I think it was argued to you, the irreplaceability of Egbert to Flemmi. And second, the fact that the Government regularly elicits from their cooperating witnesses, then Crantz, now P.A. , the very content of the communications between Kiley/P.A. , Egbert/Crantz and so there isn't that traditional risk that secret conversations unknown to the government, known to the lawyer, would give the lawyer an unfair advantage.

THE COURT: Yeah, and I haven't had time to do more than read what you filed, but, you know, these are some of the questions and it may influence the scope of the appropriate discovery. But, you know, 1, was there an attorney relationship? My present sense is that that doesn't turn on whether it was with regard to a Federal investigation or not. 2, did P.A. give Mr. Kiley information that he expected would be confidential for Mr. DiMasi or did he understand it would be shared? 3,

if he did give Mr. Kiley information that was privileged, with regard to Mr. DiMasi, has that been waived by the testimony of the grand jury? Which I think you may address in this filing I just read. I mean, I think the answer to that is probably "Yes."

And so then, um -- so if there was a relationship but it wasn't supposed to be -- the information wasn't supposed to be confidential to Mr. DiMasi and it's been waived anyway, then what's the problem -- well, what's the basis for the disqualification?

MR. FULLER: Well, it may not come to pass, but, your Honor, the real issue would then become, in order to vigorously represent Mr. DiMasi, if P.A. is testifying as laid out in the motion, there's going to have to be a cross-examination that's going to attack his credibility to some degree. And if the lawyer doing that witnessed the prior consistent statement and he's the only one who did --

THE COURT: Do we know whether Mr. Kiley was the only one who spoke -- you know, who was with P.A. when they spoke?

MR. FULLER: Well, I think, based on the record we submitted, that Mr. Kiley was the only one present. If there's a way to have Mr. Kiley stay in the case and not have that happen? But I don't know that

there is because he -- I'm sorry?

MR. MERRITT: And argue it, too. He has to get up and argue it.

MR. FULLER: Yeah. I mean, that's the issue that the Court is aware, the lawyer is the advocate, not someone testifying to a fact. So it becomes --

THE COURT: And these are things, you know, that we're going to have to -- if Mr. DiMasi continues to want Mr. Kiley and Mr. Cintolo to represent him, these are things I'm going to have to review with them. But -- and again, it's a right thing to raise at the beginning of the case before going to trial. I don't criticize you're raising it, I sort of commend you surfacing it now, because the argument that it, you know, disrupts an important relationship gets stronger as you get toward trial.

But the other question is, you know, how real is this risk that Mr. Kiley is going to be a witness? And this is part of the reason I -- and if what P.A. has told the government is consistent with what he told Mr. Kiley, not a prior inconsistent statement, um, well, or Mr. Kiley doesn't have any prior inconsistent statements that he can testify to, how would he be a witness?

MR. FULLER: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: Yeah, I mean I think your theory is that if P.A. testifies in a way that's inconsistent with what he told Mr. Kiley, Mr. Kiley is a potential witness.

MR. FULLER: What I'm saying is, if he -- in his grand jury snippet that we included, he says, in that sense, "I told Mr. Kiley the same thing that I've told the grand jury," we have essentially included a lot of that in the indictment and it inculpates, obviously, Mr. DiMasi. So if P.A. testifies consistently with that, which we expect he will, I don't understand how to vigorously defend Mr. DiMasi. He will not be attacked -- his credibility won't be attacked on what was said. If that doesn't happen --

THE COURT: Well, as I say, he'll attack his credibility and then you would want to call Mr. Kiley as a witness?

MR. FULLER: That may be what happens, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, because it was a prior consistent statement? Why was it -- and then I would ask you -- and this isn't an answer, it's a question, but was it before there was a motive to fabricate?

MR. FULLER: It was after -- it was before the grand jury subpoena and before he was contacted by the

Federal authorities.

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MR. KILEY: I think the record will be to the opposite effect on that. I think the record will be that the conversation at the time in the Secretary of State's Office is before subpoenas and Federal involvement. But I think the record will be, at the time of the -- the tell-the-truth allegation -- perish the thought that that's truly what I said, but if I undoubtedly did --

THE COURT: But before you perish the thought.

MR. KILEY: -- I think the record is going to be -- which takes me full circle what I envision doing, is dealing with redacted , who was his lawyer, who was present at the time, it would be part of what I would develop, and at that point in time they were there -- when redacted came over, it was at the time of the Federal investigation when, um, the question to tell the truth arose -- represented by another, who was present. I did not have any private communication with

P.A. at all, in that time period, and that's what the record, I'm sure, will show, which would properly put me in --

MR. FULLER: Your Honor, I don't know that that would satisfy --

THE COURT: Hold on one second. I may have asked you this before. If I did, I apologize.

Does the government have any objection to my modifying the sealing order to permit the consultation with counsel for P.A. and, if they permit, with

P.A. ?

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MR. FULLER: With counsel? If you consult with -- I'm sorry?

THE COURT: No, no, I'm going to modify the sealing orders, the sealing orders to permit -- I mean, essentially what I have in mind is issuing a protective order with regard to any discovery relating to this where all of the people working on this case can have the information, they can use it for the purpose of this case, and no other, and I would clarify whether that includes going out and interviewing witnesses. But I want to see whether you have any concern about that?

MR. MERRITT: If they want to develop a

MR. MERRITT: If they want to develop a factual record, they don't have to be shown these documents.

THE COURT: Well, no, he wants to go and talk to him. Right now it's not just the documents that are under seal, but the information in the documents that are under seal. Well, let me finish, because I don't want any confusion about this.

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Part of the reason I have a concern about closing the public proceedings is generally it's a public right to know, cases like Standard Financial Management, a civil case, and that's my case I was referring to. But my general orientation is to try and make things public, if they can properly be made public. But another reason is, um, that if I put it under seal, I don't expect to read the information in the newspaper. And if I don't have confidence that it's going to remain confidential, I'll just unseal it, so I don't have to spend my time and energy doing a leak investigation. So, I mean, that's part of it. So I just want everyone to understand that it's not just the documents that are under seal, it's the information that's impounded. MR. FULLER: I think to facilitate the Court's consideration of the motion, to the extent redacted has to be contacted, that should be fine. THE COURT: I think redacted is in there. MR. FULLER: redacted is the current attorney for --MR. KILEY: Well, my view is if I wanted to develop a factual record, I have to deal with his present counsel, his former counsel, and perhaps P.A. THE COURT: Right. I mean, this is factual.

I mean, I assume there's going to be -- you know, there's a possibility there's going to be an evidentiary hearing, there's a possibility that P.A. is going to testify in connection with this motion. But there may be a factual dispute as to what occurred. And I think Mr. Kiley has been telling me that redacted was present for at least the meetings after the first one?

MR. KILEY: I think that's what's in this, the interview with -- um, on the Federal investigation is

State matter.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Say that again?

MR. KILEY: What I want you to understand is

I'm representing to you that what I think the record

will show is that from the point in time of the Federal

investigation forward, or any knowledge with respect to

that, P.A. had counsel, it was first redacted

. I never met with him without redacted present

what I'm telling you, your Honor, not the Secretary of

in that time period. As opposed to a year earlier, or whatever it was, when he visited the Secretary of State's Office.

THE COURT: All right. But I'm going to issue -- I have to see what the discovery is, but I'm going to issue some order that's going to permit all of you to use the documents and information in connection

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with the litigation. And this is a sensitive issue.

But is there anybody other than P.A., redacted and redacted you think you would need to share this information with?

MR. KILEY: Not on this discrete issue, no.

THE COURT: I mean, on the motion to disqualify.

MR. KILEY: Well, what they're suggesting in the suggestine suggesting in the suggestine suggesti

MR. KILEY: Well, what they're suggesting is is that there may be facts within it, this notion that there might be a witness, a basis of prior inconsistent statements. I don't know what the statements are that were made --

THE COURT: Well, that's why I thought you had asked me for all of the grand jury transcripts?

MR. KILEY: Well, I probably will.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FULLER: Our position will be that that will be unnecessary and Mr. Kiley will oppose the motion. Obviously the Court will have that information.

THE COURT: No, but I -- I mean, I would perhaps review it in camera, but I don't understand the implications of everything. In other words, this is what I anticipated. I'm not sure you did. And this isn't a ruling, but it's -- it's just kind of embedded in the issue. You say -- you, the government, say that

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Mr. Kiley should be disqualified because he may have personal information about statements P.A. made that are inconsistent with what he said to the grand jury or were in an interview. But for Mr. Kiley, you know, to take a position on whether he has personal information about prior inconsistent statements, he's going to argue to me, and I'm not suggesting to him anything that --

MR, KILEY: You're not.

THE COURT: -- that he has to know what the statements were. And if there's something important in the grand jury that he thinks, you know, Mr. DiMasi would need him to be a witness for, I would expect him to get out of the case. If on the other hand he comes in and argues, "I've read the whole grand jury transcript and it's entirely consistent with what

P.A. called me, " "told me, " then, 1, he'll argue "There's no need for Mr. DiMasi to call me as a witness, and if the government wants to call me as a witness, you ought to exclude that under Rule 403," because, you know, he probably told other people this, too, like redacted, or somebody.

MR. FULLER: Well, the Government's position is that Mr. Kiley can assess that -- granted the entire transcript is not incorporated in the indictment, but

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the key allegations that are -- certainly the ones that are incriminating, and there may be others, but to Mr, DiMasi are there. Mr. Kiley can sit here today and tell the Court or factfinder if that information was consistent or inconsistent without seeing the transcript. So given that there is a possibility he could be a witness, then why run the risk of producing the entire transcript especially when the Court would have the opportunity to review it? I think Mr. Kiley would end up probably being a witness in a motion -- in this evidentiary hearing, should there be one. You know, and that poses another thought, whether or not there needs to be standby counsel to conduct that hearing. You know, there's unfortunately a lot of lawyers here.

But on the main point about the access to the transcript, there's enough information in the indictment P.A. about what said that I think Mr. Kiley would be able to know whether or not it was consistent with what the witness told him.

MR. KILEY: One other fact that I want to make sure that we put on the record in this conference, which is not reflected in the government's pleadings, is that

, at least through the Government, is not P.A. seeking my disqualification or asserting any kind of

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privilege or confidentiality. A very important consideration, your Honor.

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MR. WEINBERG: I think one other factor that was raised by Mr. Goldstein --

THE COURT: I don't know that.

THE COURT: Well, hold on just one second. (Pause.)

words, this is a motion under seal. I don't know what P.A.'s position is in connection with that. And I think the government probably knows this, but it's just important to be sensitive to these things. wouldn't be proper for the government to, under the ethical rules, to discourage P.A. from talking to Mr. Kiley, if he wanted to -- and he's probably got a lawyer and we would probably have to go through his lawyer, I haven't looked at this, but, you know, the witnesses are equally available to anybody and he can talk to the government, if he wants, he can talk to the defendant, if he wants. But there are cases that point out the impropriety of the government instructing or encouraging the witness not to talk to the defense. Go ahead.

MR. KILEY: Just the -- I think the government makes the representation, in Footnote 10 in their original submission to you, with respect to the current

1 intentions, as they understand it, of P.A. 2 have not made that --3 THE COURT: What does it say his intentions 4 are? 5 MR. FULLER: Footnote 4, your Honor. 6 sorry, 7 MR. KILEY: I think 1 is the original 4 now? 8 MR. FULLER: Page 4. "Counsel for P.A. has advised that while P.A. 9 believes" --10 THE COURT: Not too fast. He's got to write 11 this down. 12 MR. FULLER: I forgot we had a reporter here. "Counsel for P.A. has advised that while P.A. 13 14 believes he had an attorney-client relationship with 15 Attorneys Kiley and Cintolo, he does not seek disqualification from this matter." That's in the 16 17 footnote. 18 THE COURT: Oh, okay. All right, Well, did 19 somebody else want to be heard on this? 20 MR. WEINBERG: Just briefly. We've worked 21 together towards trying to get common grounds for 22 discovery. We've worked with Mr. Fuller and we're 23 working on two different levels, one to try to agree to 24 a protective order that your Honor will consider fair. 25 Second, to receive electronic discovery, which we expect

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in huge volumes, in a format that's user friendly and searchable. And Mr. Fuller and I are working towards that end.

But what interfaces with the disqualification issue is I think all parties will tell you that this is an enormous case in terms of the magnitude of the grand jury, the magnitude of the expected documents, the complexity. It's interfaced with state law where Mr. Kiley is a preeminent authority of great value to all members of this defense, small defense community. He's not fungible. He's not replaceable, particularly in a case where there's some hope for a speedy trial. In contrast to some expectation, we're going to be getting a huge electronic volume of discovery and I hope your Honor considers his value not only to Mr. DiMasi, but to the administration of justice in terms of a speedy trial.

THE COURT: I don't know that that's a cognizable consideration. But -- here, with regard to a possible protective order, take a look at **Salemme**, 978 F. Supp. 386 at 390. This is the sort of format for a protective order that I would probably enter. I was thinking of doing it now. But how --

MR. MERRITT: May I ask a procedural question, your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MERRITT: Is the Court rescinding the order of reference? Is the Court going to be handling discovery matters?

THE COURT: I may be. I probably will be, unless you -- well, I'm going on vacation in July. I think everybody knows that. Are you, too?

MR, MERRITT: Yeah.

THE COURT: Good. Make your plans for next July, too, and maybe we'll try the case a year from September, if not earlier, which would be great from my perspective. I mean, I'm with Mr. Goldstein, you know, I want this to go.

But, you know, I'm -- I probably will take the case. And I haven't decided when, but -- well, that's part of the reason I wanted to see you, because I don't -- I don't want any appeals. It's a waste of time to have things done twice. And I might as well, you know, have a feel for all of this, about what you're talking about, not to have somebody tell me, "Well, we've discussed that with the Magistrate Judge." But, you know -- that's probably what's coming.

So basically what do you propose as a way of proceeding? Do you propose to litigate any discovery issues? Do you want a modification of the impoundment

orders so you can do some investigation? When do you propose to respond to the government's filings?

MR. KILEY: Um, I would anticipate first seeking all of the grand jury -- if this issue of me as a potential witness on an inconsistent statement is real, I will press -- I will file a motion. If I may have until -- is Monday too soon to get the grand jury?

THE COURT: And you can say, "No," but next Tuesday is my last day in the office until August. So what do you want to do?

MR. KILEY: Just for the transcript, I want to get --

MR. CINTOLO: If it's just for the transcript. We've got a brief in the Ninth Circuit to do.

MR. KILEY: I do know that.

THE COURT: Well, we might as well talk about this. If you want to file something, you should file it simultaneously maybe while I'm on vacation. But the point is that I think the government is not going to agree to give you the transcript. At least they didn't come in here intending to give them to you and normally there are good reasons for not wanting to give them. On the other hand, you need to understand that Mr. -- well, that Mr. Kiley is going to argue, "How can we make a

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properly-informed decision as to whether I have any information inconsistent with what P.A. told the government if I don't see everything he told the government?"

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Could I have one more point, your Honor?

THE COURT: Well, in -- then, you know, and then you'll explain to me, as you began to explain it to me, why he doesn't need it for these purposes or why I should look at it. The problem is that I don't know the case except for essentially what I read in the indictment and what you told me, and I don't know what

P.A. told Mr. Kiley. He's the one who would know whether it's inconsistent or not. If they got it, it would be subject to some kind of protective order similar to what you'll see in Salemme, which limits the use.

MR. KILEY: My first step would be that. I would envision that within two weeks after securing the transcripts, I would -- and I'm assuming that I'm going to be able to communicate with redacted and, if permissible, P.A., if permitted by redacted, to develop the factual record and do a submission again two weeks after I get the grand jury.

THE COURT: All right. And I assume the

government would want some time to respond to that? 1 2 MR. FULLER: Yes, your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Is there any hope that you could 4 agree on the discovery, I mean, if you talk further sort 5 of reflecting on this discussion? б MR. FULLER: On the transcript? 7 THE COURT: Yes. 8 MR. FULLER: I don't think so. 9 MR. MERRITT: I mean, granted Mr. Kiley wants 10 to proffer to us what P.A. told him and then we 11 can go in that direction. 12 MR. KILEY: I'm not in a position to do that. 13 THE COURT: Okay. Well, it sounds like -- so 14 when do you propose to make your motion? 15 MR. KILEY: I proposed Monday until Bill kicked me under the table --16 17 MR. CINTOLO: Wednesday? Next Wednesday? 18 THE COURT: Okay. This may not be great from Mr. Goldstein's perspective, but it obviously is not 19 20 going to get resolved before I go away. So next 21 Wednesday? 22 MR, CINTOLO: Still in June? 23 THE COURT: I'm not going to leave -- next Tuesday is my last day in the courthouse until August, 24 25 which is why I gave you Friday.

1 MR. CINTOLO: Well then, Monday. I'll do it 2 Monday. That's okay. 3 THE COURT: No, no, I've got plenty to do. 4 I'm going to be doing the Sampson death penalty habeas 5 on Monday. I'm not going to be sitting there waiting 6 for your motion. Because the government is going to 7 have to have time to respond to it anyway, You want to 8 read their motion and respond to it. 9 About how much time do you think you want to 10 respond to it? 11 MR. FULLER: Two weeks is customary. 12 THE COURT: All right, Can I have Dennis's 13 calendar, please. 14 MR. FULLER: Oh, on the transcript? 15 MR. KILEY: This is just on the transcript. 16 MR. FULLER: Oh, probably -- I hate to cut my 17 own time, but that says a week, so --18 THE COURT: Well, he's going on vacation, so a 19 week is fine with him. 20 MR. FULLER: Okay, two weeks. Sorry, your 21 Honor, 22 THE COURT: All right. The defendant's motion 23 for discovery, because you may be talking about more 24 than the transcript. Well, first of all, I'm going to

order that you confer on this before you file. You've

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got to let some of this sink in a bit and maybe you can reach some resolution. Look at my protective order. Look at the -- you know, what they're requesting.

Is it just the grand jury transcript or is it going to be more than the grand jury transcript?

MR. KILEY: We ask for the statements, the 3500 material, but it's just -- it's limited to

THE COURT: All right. So defendants are going to file that motion on Wednesday -- if I'm going to give them two weeks, Mr. Cintolo, do you want a little more time? Do you want till the end of next week?

MR. CINTOLO: That would be fine.

THE COURT: Here, I'm going to give you until the 29th. And I'm ordering that you confer before you file anything, because, you know, the government never wants to give this up a year in advance. But as soon as I read the motion, I knew that this was going to be the issue. Because, at a minimum, the issue of Mr. Kiley as a witness relates to -- there may be another way to deal with it, but it relates to what did P.A. Because there's a -- well, you know, if the government -- you know, you may be able to evade it, if you want to do this, but then it concerns me, if not full disclosure, because then Mr. DiMasi has to know what

1 kind of risk he's assuming. But if you say, you know, 2 "We're concerned only that Mr. Kiley would be a witness 3 on A, B, C, and D and, you know, we've given him A, B, 4 C, and D, " but that might not cut through it because --5 MR. FULLER: I would probably think Mr. Kiley 6 is going to want all of it. So we'll confer, your 7 Honor, absolutely. 8 THE COURT: Yeah, reflect on it. Because it 9 really is just inherent in the issue the way you posed 10 it and it strikes me as the right way to pose it. 11 That's one of the issues, is he a necessary witness? 12 MR. FULLER: Well, that isn't the only issue. I don't want to suggest that --13 14 THE COURT: Yeah, I say it's one of the 15 issues. 16 MR. FULLER: Yes. 17 THE COURT: And it might be the dispositive 18 issue. So --19 MR. CINTOLO: That's under seal, correct, your 20 Honor, to file it under seal? 21 THE COURT: Yeah, I'll give you an order 22 because -- well, every time you file something under 23 seal, also under seal is -- well, we're going to come 24 back to this, as to whether I'm going to open all of 25 this. You've got to file -- and I'll tell you, in my

order, either publicly or also under seal, a redacted copy, so when all of this -- this is all going to get unsealed, at this point, but probably with redactions, which you all will have to make carefully, including to this transcript. But I'll give you something in writing on how to file.

All right. And so if that's filed on June 29th, Mr. Fuller wants two weeks to respond on discovery, so that would take us to the 13th. But you've got the 4th of July in there. Do you want until the 15th?

MR. FULLER: (Silence.)

THE COURT: To respond to discovery?

MR. FULLER: That's fine, your Honor.

THE COURT: You can do it sooner, if you want,

but you wanted the two weeks. I want you to get a little vacation, too.

MR. FULLER: I have a trial starting the 13th, so that's not going to matter to me.

THE COURT: All right. So do you want me to give you the 10th?

(Laughter.)

MR. FULLER: The 15th is fine, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, the 15th. If there's any

reply that's going to be filed, it will be the 22nd.

I'll get this and perhaps decide it before I come back.

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But once I determine what the discovery is, I'm going to give Mr. Kiley two weeks after that to file his opposition and then I'll give the government one week to reply, and I expect I'll schedule a hearing, which I would aim to conduct in August.

MR. CINTOLO: In the interim -- I know you're going to address this, but will we be allowed to contact redacted?

THE COURT: Yes, I think with some restrictions. Well, the short answer is "Yes," you're going to have to get a written order. But the -- but if the government doesn't object to it. But I think it's probably necessary.

MR. DRECHSLER: Your Honor, I do plan on taking some time off in August.

THE COURT: I was just going to ask you that. When will that be?

MR. DRECHSLER: Well, I haven't finally determined that. But I would say this, I was going to ask, anyway, that if a hearing is conducted solely on the issue of disqualification, I'm privately retained, my client and I are trying to conserve resources, and so if the hearing is solely going to be on that issue, whether evidentiary or nonevidentiary, that I be excused from that day and I wouldn't interfere with the Court's

schedule on that.

THE COURT: Any time I schedule a hearing, if it's on an issue that doesn't involve one of your clients and you prefer not to be there, you can just file something and say that you've consulted your client and, you know, he and you request that you be excused.

MR. DRECHSLER: I haven't determined yet, but I'm going to be taking a couple of weeks off in August, but not consecutively, probably the 3rd and then the last week before Labor Day. But I haven't confirmed that.

THE COURT: Well, until I get the briefing, you know, it's conceivable that we'll be doing that right after Labor Day, hopefully before.

Now, I think I have two options, at this point, with regard to opening these proceedings. I want to read what the government filed more closely, but now the government is advocating that this be open and the documents be unsealed. Is that correct?

MR. MERRITT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And do the defendants still oppose that?

MR. KILEY: Well, I never thought it was our motion, I thought it was the Government's, and  $\dot{I}$  -- your Honor, my view is that the wisest course, because there

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are allegations that may not pan out with respect to privilege, that the wisest course is to keep sealed, until you're ready to make findings with respect to privilege, when you are ready to make those findings, I heard the Court loud and clear that at some point this matter is going to be public,

THE COURT: It is, and I really want it to be public when, after hearing you, I decide it's going to be public and not read it in the newspaper, but you've been really good on that so far. You know, you share this interest.

My inclination is not to unseal anything now, um, but to revisit this when I have the defendant's response and maybe the government's reply on the merits, to basically revisit this in August. You should order the transcript and the parties should review it and make any necessary redactions. If you want P.A.'s name out, you'll have to give me a redacted copy.

I'm willing to -- you know, because if this -- if I order disclosure of the grand jury transcripts, which is probably the next issue I'm going to have to decide, you know, the government might have a different view on how much of this ought to be public. It seems to be a very fluid situation.

But does the government want to be heard further

1 on that? 2 MR. MERRITT: Well, your Honor, I'm sort of 3 handling the --4 THE COURT: Well, that's fine. 5 MR. MERRITT: I don't think -- well, our б position is, at this point, that the Court has enough 7 for it to make the determination that there aren't 8 countervailing considerations that have been proffered 9 by the defendants that would rebut the presumption of 10 openness. Both parties agree essentially, although no 11 one has come out directly and said it, but that if there 12 was an attorney-client privilege, it has been waived by 13 P.A. in talking to the government. So that is 14 just kind of a specter of attorney-client privilege. I 15 don't think that's a real issue for the Court to find 16 that there's a reason to keep this in these closed 17 proceedings. And, well, the Court can read our thing, 18 but this is the kind of proceeding that is and should be 19 open to the public. 20 THE COURT: I know, that's what I told you 21 initially. 22 MR. MERRITT: Well, we agree with the Court, 23 but --

No, I --

MR. WEINBERG: I think there will be a

THE COURT:

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countervailing factor that probably isn't yet directly on the table. As I go back to the Flemmi case, I quite frankly can't remember, because I did some of the representation with Mr. Egbert, whether we filed a brief that was based on U.S. vs. Cunningham, the Second Circuit case of 472 Fd. 2nd or not? And I know one of the key variables will be, for Mr. Kiley, to disclose to the Court the full extent of his prior relationship with Mr. DiMasi and the extent to which counsel of choice and his replaceability or irreplaceability is at stake. And therefore there will be, I think, matters Mr. Kiley will want to present to the Court about the historic attorney-client privilege that he would not want to be disclosed to the public.

THE COURT: But that's not inconsistent with unsealing the documents that exist to date. People -- you know, the public would know that there's an issue that the government is seeking to disqualify Mr. DiMasi's attorney, but you could file a motion to submit something particular under seal. The question is whether the whole thing is secret, which is what I felt uncomfortable with to begin with.

Well, I'm going to do the following, because you need to get to work on this. I ordered the Government to file redacted versions of this submission, which it's

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going to correct by Friday. But all parties should file redacted versions of their submissions in case I decide to unseal something before I go, I'm ordering that you order the transcript, which may take a while to prepare because we're doing a lot of things, and you're going to have to review this transcript and propose redactions. I'll put it in an order and I'll give you one week to propose redactions.

The government and the defendant, you should confer. Whoever is serving as -- if I decide to unseal this, um, before I go, I'll ask whoever is working as my Deputy Clerk in the matter to give you a heads-up. mean, you'll get the order or I'll issue the order and the redacted versions will be put on the public record the next day or something like that.

But the basic principle is that there's a presumption of public access, that's in part to hold the prosecutor -- you know, so the public can hold the prosecutors accountable and so that the public can hold me accountable as the judge. And in this case, you know, we're not talking about unlitigated Title IIIs, there's not a question of whether, you know, if you had a wiretap, and two people were discussing killing somebody and there was a question about whether that was going to be excluded, in evidence, whether it was going

to be suppressed, that could be unfairly prejudicial if it was publicized and never got into evidence. But it sounds to me like what's in the government's submission, you know, is going to be P.A. -- or, you know, some statements by P.A. based on his personal knowledge, if they're relevant then they would come into evidence. So there's not that kind of risk of unfair prejudice that we would be dealing with if we were dealing with an unlitigated Title III.

And I think it's your position, Mr. Kiley, that this was never intended to be confidential for Mr. DiMasi and it was never -- and, you know, and it wouldn't be improper for you to make it public in cross-examining P.A.

MR. KILEY: That's right. The government's motion to disqualify me is predicated in part on the notion that I possess confidential or privileged information. I don't believe I do. But if I do -- but if I do, then information pertaining to these proceedings, under **sidel**, is precisely the kind of thing that can override the presumption for that, but just for that.

MR. WEINBERG: Could I just raise one other issue to support that? The courtroom was packed with media today. If your Honor was to unseal this prior to,

rather than after making the decision to hopefully retain Mr. Kiley as counsel, there's going to be far more predictable publicity and publicity that may somewhere, in some juror's mind, have the potential for discrediting all defense counsel. The government is moving on ethical and legal grounds to disqualify one of us. If, again, the publicity was unsealed, there would be no prejudice to the media, they can integrate it with your Honor's ultimate decision --

to do to be fair. Here goes my vacation again. You've got to have a chance to respond to what the government just filed. I mean, I'm the one who raised the issue. I think -- I'm uncomfortable with doing all of this secretly. I mean, I had eight hearings that were closed when we were talking about whether I would order the FBI to disclose if Whitey Bulger and Stevie Flemmi were informants, because if that information got out, somebody could get killed. And if I wasn't going to order it, I mean -- I mean, that that's what was at the heart of the case. But this isn't the same situation. I don't think they cited my June 6th Salemme decision where I discussed some of this, including Amadeo, which I noticed was in your papers.

But I don't, at the moment, see waiting until the

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end to do a decision on this motion and then unsealing it. I think I'm likely to unseal it before then.

Having said that, I do think there are legitimate competing interests. I'd like to be somewhat surgical in deciding what gets unsealed. There are things that I think that the government is not going to want out. If I order the grand jury transcripts be disclosed, I don't think the defendants should just be able to just dump them all on the public record. And I'll have a protective order. And I don't think they would do that.

But, Mr. Weinberg, do you want an opportunity to respond to what the government filed yesterday?

MR. WEINBERG: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Why don't you take until a week from Monday.

MR. WEINBERG: Thank you, sir.

THE COURT: It's a little less than the traditional 14 days, but the 14 days probably falls on the 4th of July.

MR. KILEY: If you had asked me, I would have been saying, yes, your Honor, too.

THE COURT: Well, you want it, too? Yeah, you all can.

MR. KILEY: Of course. Of course.

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THE COURT: But, you know, I'm the one who raised the question. You know, now the government's come around to my perspective, which I think is consistent with the instructions they generally have from the Attorney General that you're supposed to have open proceedings. But, you know -- and again, this is another thing you all should be talking about, maybe you -- I mean, you can always move to file things under seal and I'm likely to let you file them under seal, at least temporarily, until I can read them and hear if there's a dispute and consider the public interest, same as I did with the original motion.

So I suppose there's -- you know, there's reason to be careful. Arguably attorney-client relationships are involved. But, you know, I'm disinclined to keep all of this out of public view until it's resolved. And, you know, if you talk to each other and you can suggest some parameters that you agree on, I may agree, too. Or I may not, since initially you all agreed that they should all be closed and then I didn't have the concern.

(Pause,)

THE COURT: All right. Hopefully you've been taking notes. I'll get you a written order. probably get you two written orders, one that relates to

1 what happened in open court and one that relates to 2 what's happening here, But I'm not quite sure when 3 you'll get the written order as to what occurred here, 4 So keep your notes. 5 (Pause,) 6 THE COURT: I had a couple of other 7 questions. 8 Okay. All of this discussion has been about 9 P.A. . Is there a possible Mr. Kiley meeting with 10 disqualification concerning Mr. Cintolo flowing from the 11 fact that they're partners? 12 MR. FULLER: We're not sure. Again, it would 13 be the knowledge of the attorney whether or not he met 14 with Mr. Cintolo is --15 THE COURT: Well, I'll help you out. 16 Have you had any of the meetings with 17 ? P.A. 18 MR. CINTOLO: Yes. 19 THE COURT: How many? 20 MR. CINTOLO: Two, The ones with redacted. 21 MR. FULLER: And we know he is a partner. 22 THE COURT: Oh, I know. But you just found --23 MR. FULLER: Yes, we suspected as much, but 24 thank you, your Honor. 25 THE COURT: Well, you should ask him.

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might have even told you.

MR. WEINBERG: Yes. May Mr. Vitale be excused to go to the men's room?

THE COURT: Yes. There's actually one right back there. But we're almost finished.

(Mr. Vitale leaves.)

THE COURT: All right. And, Mr. DiMasi, at some point, um, I'm going to ask you a series of questions as to whether you understand all of this and you understand the arguments, the arguable risks to you. As I said earlier, I'm not ordering you to go to yet another lawyer to get independent advice, but I'll probably ask you whether you did, because my responsibility, you know, is to the fairness of the proceedings and to be sure that, you know, you're comfortable, that you're being effectively and energetically represented by somebody who has no competing interest, not by somebody who says, you know, "I could be a witness, but I'm a lawyer, so I won't be a witness, even though I could help as a witness type of thing." So I want to encourage you to think all of these things through.

I'm not saying don't talk to Mr. Kiley and Mr. Cintolo about it, but it may be in your interest to talk to somebody else about it. I may well ask you

that. But, you know, once I ask you, unless something unforeseen comes up, as far as I'm concerned, you're going to have to live with the answer.

So, you know, sometimes we see this. You know, somebody is happy with their lawyer and then they get convicted and they say, "I wasn't effectively represented." I would like to do this one time and in a way that's fair to everybody and the decisions are made on an informed basis and there's no reason to reopen it. All right?

Is there anything else we ought to discuss? Okay. Rest up.

MR. WEINBERG: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. KILEY: Thank you, your Honor.

(Ends, 1:15 p.m.)

## CERTIFICATE

I, RICHARD H. ROMANOW, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER, do hereby certify that the foregoing record is a true and accurate transcription of my stenographic notes, before Chief Judge Mark L. Wolf, on Wednesday, June 17, 2009, to the best of my skill and ability.